A Practical Reference Architecture for Agentic AI Controls
Gateway/Sidecar + Evidence Pipeline. When orgs say they want 'AI governance', they usually mean policies or model-level safety. But neither is sufficient once you deploy agents that can take real actions.
- Why policies and model guardrails alone aren't enough for agentic AI.
- Two deployment patterns — Gateway (central) vs Sidecar (distributed).
- Two-stage decisioning and why evidence pipelines are non-negotiable.
A Practical Reference Architecture for Agentic AI Controls: Gateway/Sidecar + Evidence Pipeline
When orgs say they want "AI governance", they usually mean one of two things:
- Policies and process (reviews, standards, committees)
- Model-level safety features (filters, guardrails, prompt patterns)
Both matter.
But neither is sufficient once you deploy agents that can take real actions.
What you need is a third thing:
An operational control plane at runtime.
The Architecture Pattern That Actually Scales
For agentic systems, the most durable pattern looks like this:
Agent → Control Point (Gateway/Sidecar) → Tools/APIs → Outcomes → Evidence Pipeline
Think of it like a service mesh for agent actions:
- You don't trust every service to self-police
- You enforce policy at the boundary
- And you generate consistent telemetry and evidence
Reference Architecture: Gateway/Sidecar + Evidence Pipeline
The following diagram shows the complete reference architecture for agentic AI controls—from policy authoring through runtime enforcement to evidence capture.
flowchart TB
%% Reference Architecture: Gateway/Sidecar + Evidence Pipeline
subgraph Clients["Agent Callers"]
A1["Agent App / Workflow"]
A2["Multi-Agent Orchestrator"]
end
subgraph ControlPlane["FuseGov Control Plane"]
P1["Policy Authoring<br/>Controls, Risk Tiers"]
P2["Policy Registry<br/>Versioned Bundles"]
P3["Key Mgmt / Signing<br/>Attest Bundle Integrity"]
end
subgraph Runtime["Runtime Enforcement Layer"]
direction TB
subgraph OptionG["Option A: Central Gateway"]
G1["Agent Gateway<br/>(Policy Enforcement Point)"]
G2["Stage 1: Deterministic Checks<br/>IAM, scopes, allowlists, rate limits"]
G3["Stage 2: Semantic Verification<br/>Intent / context checks"]
G4{"Degraded Mode?"}
end
subgraph OptionS["Option B: Sidecar per Agent"]
S1["Agent Runtime"]
S2["Sidecar PEP<br/>(Intercept Tool Calls)"]
S3["Stage 1: Deterministic Checks"]
S4["Stage 2: Semantic Verification"]
S5{"Degraded Mode?"}
end
end
subgraph Tools["Tooling / Action Surface"]
T1["Internal APIs"]
T2["SaaS APIs"]
T3["Databases"]
T4["Cloud Control Plane"]
T5["Human Systems<br/>(Ticketing, Email)"]
end
subgraph Evidence["Evidence Pipeline"]
E1["Decision Events<br/>(Allow/Deny/Escalate + Rationale)"]
E2["Action Telemetry<br/>(What was called, when, where)"]
E3["Outcome Verification<br/>(What changed)"]
E4["Evidence Pack Builder<br/>(Normalize, Hash/Sign, Bundle)"]
E5[("Immutable Evidence Store")]
E6[("SIEM")]
E7[("GRC / Audit")]
E8[("Analytics / Data Lake")]
end
%% Policy distribution
P1 --> P2
P3 --> P2
P2 --> G1
P2 --> S2
%% Traffic paths
A1 --> G1
A2 --> G1
A1 --> S1
S1 --> S2
%% Gateway pipeline
G1 --> G2 --> G3 --> G4
G4 -->|Proceed| Tools
G4 -->|Block| Tools
%% Sidecar pipeline
S2 --> S3 --> S4 --> S5
S5 -->|Proceed| Tools
S5 -->|Block| Tools
%% Evidence emission
G1 --> E1
G2 --> E1
G3 --> E1
S2 --> E1
S3 --> E1
S4 --> E1
Tools --> E2
Tools --> E3
E1 --> E4
E2 --> E4
E3 --> E4
E4 --> E5
E4 --> E6
E4 --> E7
E4 --> E8
Where the Control Point Sits
You have two deployment options (and most enterprises use both):
1) Gateway Pattern (Centralized)
A single policy enforcement gateway between agents and tools.
| Aspect | Details |
|---|---|
| Best for | Standardization, centralized policy control, multi-agent environments |
| Deployment | Single cluster/service, all agent traffic routes through |
| Trade-offs | Simpler ops, but potential bottleneck; single policy version |
2) Sidecar Pattern (Distributed)
A sidecar injected next to each agent runtime / workload.
| Aspect | Details |
|---|---|
| Best for | Segmentation, autonomy, least privilege, multi-tenant isolation |
| Deployment | Per-agent or per-workload, Kubernetes-native |
| Trade-offs | More flexible, but harder to observe centrally |
Both do the same core job: Intercept tool calls, evaluate policy, then allow/deny/transform.
What Happens at Runtime: Two-Stage Decisioning
In practice, you need two layers:
Stage 1: Deterministic Enforcement (Fast, Reliable)
- Identity / attestation checks
- Tool allowlists, scopes, rate limits
- Data classification constraints
- Budget/token/cost caps
- Required approvals (if risk tier demands it)
Stage 2: Semantic Verification (Context-Aware)
- Intent checks ("does this action match approved purpose?")
- Policy interpretation where natural language is unavoidable
- Anomaly detection across sequences of actions
If Stage 2 fails or becomes uncertain:
Degraded mode kicks in:
- Block high-risk actions
- Require approval
- Or route to safe alternatives
flowchart LR
A["Tool Call Request"] --> B["Stage 1<br/>Deterministic"]
B -->|Pass| C["Stage 2<br/>Semantic"]
B -->|Fail| D["DENY"]
C -->|Pass| E["ALLOW"]
C -->|Uncertain| F["Degraded Mode"]
F --> G["Block / Approve / Safe Alt"]
The Evidence Pipeline (The Part Most Stacks Forget)
Enforcement without evidence is just another claim.
So every decision emits structured events into an evidence pipeline:
| Event Type | What's Captured |
|---|---|
| Decision logs | Allow/deny + reason |
| Policy bundle versioning | Which rules evaluated |
| Input/output hashes | Optional for sensitive payloads |
| Human approvals | Escalation trail |
| Exception handling | Degraded mode activations |
| Post-action verification | What changed, what was touched |
From There You Can Route To:
- SIEM — Security monitoring
- GRC tooling — Control testing / audit
- Data lake — Analytics + drift detection
Why This Architecture Wins Politically Inside Enterprises
Because it separates concerns cleanly:
| Team | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| AI teams | Ship features and agents |
| Security | Sets policy and risk tiers |
| GRC | Gets evidence without begging engineering |
| Audit | Gets repeatable artifacts, not screenshots |
Implementation Considerations
Policy Distribution
flowchart LR
A["Policy Author<br/>(Security/GRC)"] --> B["Policy Registry"]
B --> C["Signed Bundle"]
C --> D["Gateway"]
C --> E["Sidecar 1"]
C --> F["Sidecar N"]
- Policies are versioned and signed
- Control points pull or receive push updates
- Bundle integrity is attested before enforcement
Evidence Chain Integrity
Every evidence pack includes:
{
"event_id": "evt_9k2m4n",
"timestamp": "2026-01-09T01:33:00Z",
"policy_version": "2.1.0",
"stage_1_result": "PASS",
"stage_2_result": "PASS",
"decision": "ALLOW",
"hash": "sha256:b4f7...",
"previous_hash": "sha256:a3f2..."
}
The previous_hash creates an immutable chain—tampering is mathematically detectable.
The Punchline
If agentic AI is the new "automation workforce", then:
Gateway/sidecar controls + evidence pipeline is the minimum viable safety architecture.
Anything less is hoping your policies will behave like runtime controls.
Getting Started Checklist
- Decide deployment pattern: Gateway, Sidecar, or Hybrid
- Define risk tiers for your agent actions
- Author initial policy bundle with allowlists/scopes
- Configure Stage 1 deterministic checks
- (Optional) Enable Stage 2 semantic verification
- Connect evidence pipeline to SIEM/GRC
- Test degraded mode behavior
- Go live with monitoring
Author: Tushar Mishra Published: 09 Jan 2026 Version: v1.0 License: © Tushar Mishra
This post is part of the FuseGov Reference Architecture series. The Gateway/Sidecar + Evidence Pipeline pattern represents the foundational deployment model for operational AI governance.
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