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Tushar Mishra

The Operational Authenticity Layer: A Complete Reference Architecture for Governing Agentic AI in Production

A full-stack, audit-ready architecture for agentic AI governance: policy lifecycle, registries, hybrid enforcement, approvals, and immutable evidence.

In this post
  • Governance must become runtime infrastructure — enforceable, verifiable, and evidenced.
  • The complete control plane includes policy lifecycle, registries, hybrid PEPs, approvals, and immutable evidence.
  • A production model requires resilience, testing, drift detection, and measurable control effectiveness.
agentic AI governanceoperational authenticityruntime governanceAI security architectureAI agent frameworkAI gatewayAI sidecarevidence pack

Agentic AI changes one thing that security architecture has depended on for decades:

Actions are no longer human-paced.

Agents can plan, decide, and execute across real systems—APIs, SaaS platforms, databases, and cloud control planes—at machine speed.

So the old governance approach fails:

  • Write a policy
  • Approve a standard
  • Do an assessment
  • Hope engineers implement it correctly

That model worked when humans were the bottleneck.

With agents, it doesn't.

What enterprises need now is a third layer of security architecture—beyond authentication and authorization:

Operational Authenticity: the ability to enforce, verify, and evidence intent-aligned AI behavior at runtime.

This is the complete reference architecture for implementing that layer.


The Problem: Governance Can't Keep Up With Capability

Most AI governance programs are strong on:

  • Principles
  • Committees
  • Model reviews
  • Documentation

But they break under audit pressure because they can't answer:

"Which controls operated for this agent action, in this production transaction, under this policy version, with this approval trail, producing this evidence?"

That is why "governance" must evolve into runtime control infrastructure.


The Architecture (End-to-End)

This architecture is built around one simple idea:

  • ✅ Every agent action must pass through an enforcement point
  • ✅ Every enforcement decision must emit evidence
  • ✅ Every evidence artifact must be integrity-protected and exportable

Core Components

# Component Purpose
1 Policy Lifecycle & Governance Policy-as-code → approval → signed bundles
2 Registries Tools + agents as governed assets
3 Hybrid Enforcement Layer Gateway + sidecars
4 Approvals & Exceptions Step-up auth + time-boxed waivers
5 Data Protection Classification, redaction, DLP hooks
6 Evidence Pipeline Decision logs → evidence packs → immutable store + SIEM/GRC
7 Resilience & Degraded Mode Safe failure behavior
8 Drift Detection Coverage, config, inventory drift
9 Testing & Simulation Observe-only, canary, scenario harness
10 Operational Metrics Control effectiveness, assurance reporting

1) Policy Lifecycle & Governance: Ship Controls Like Software

Governance becomes enforceable only when controls become deployable artifacts.

Policy Lifecycle (Minimum Viable)

Step Function
Policy-as-code repo Git / PR reviews
Approval workflow CISO / GRC / Security Architecture
Policy compiler + bundle builder Human intent → machine rules
Bundle signing KMS/HSM attestation
Policy registry Versioned bundles
Rollback + drift monitoring Change safety

Why This Matters

Auditors don't trust intent. They trust provenance:

  • Who approved it?
  • Which version was deployed?
  • Was runtime policy consistent with approval?

If you can't answer those, you don't have a control environment—only documentation.


2) Registries: Inventory Is Governance

Agents act through tools. Tools have blast radius.

So governance needs inventory that is machine-readable and operational.

Tool Registry (Governing the Action Surface)

Every tool entry should include:

Field Purpose
Owner + system owner Accountability
Risk tier LOW / MED / HIGH / CRITICAL
Allowed operations READ/WRITE/DELETE/ADMIN
Scope constraints Tenant/project/OU boundaries
Data class constraints PUBLIC → SECRET
Spend and rate limits Cost caps, QPS
Approval rules Conditions requiring escalation
Evidence requirements What to log, what to hash-only

Agent Registry (Governing Autonomous Actors)

Every agent entry should include:

Field Purpose
Agent id + owner/team Identity
Permitted intents/purposes Scope bounding
Allowed tool groups / risk tiers Access control
Max data classification Data protection
Runtime identity requirements Workload identity
Approval thresholds Human oversight triggers

If it isn't in the registries, it isn't governable.


3) Hybrid Enforcement: Gateway + Sidecar PEPs

Pure gateway architectures fail in enterprise reality. Pure sidecar architectures fail at shared tools and central visibility.

Hybrid solves both:

Pattern Best For
Sidecars Fast, segmented, resilient enforcement close to workloads
Gateway Centralized, consistent governance for shared/high-risk tools

Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs)

Every tool call is intercepted and evaluated at a PEP:

  • Sidecar PEP for local tools, low latency, per-team autonomy
  • Gateway PEP for shared tools, high-risk actions, org-wide controls

4) Two-Stage Enforcement: Deterministic + Semantic

Agent governance needs two layers because not all controls are the same.

Stage 1: Deterministic Enforcement (Fast, Reliable)

This is where most security controls belong:

  • Identity and workload checks
  • Allowlists and scopes
  • Rate limits and cost caps
  • Data classification constraints
  • Tool risk-tier gating
  • Required approvals
  • "Unknown tool" handling

Stage 2: Semantic Verification (Context-Aware)

Used where interpretation is unavoidable:

  • Intent alignment ("does this match permitted purpose?")
  • Suspicious sequences (multi-step exfil patterns)
  • Policy conditions that depend on context

Mode Selection (Safe Rollout)

Mode Behavior
Observe-only Log decisions without blocking (pilot-friendly)
Enforce Allow/deny at runtime
Escalate Route to approval workflow

5) Approvals & Exceptions: Reality, but Controlled

Enterprises require exceptions. The goal is not "no exceptions." The goal is governed exceptions.

Approval Lane

  • Step-up authentication for high-risk approvals
  • Approval workflow integration (ServiceNow/Jira/Slack)
  • Approvals recorded as first-class evidence events

Exception Lane (Waivers)

  • Time-boxed waivers (expiry required)
  • Compensating controls required
  • Waiver issuance and usage are evidenced
  • Reports show waiver volume, expiry compliance, and risk tier

This prevents "break-glass" from becoming "permanent bypass."


6) Data Protection: Classification, Redaction, and DLP Hooks

Action safety is inseparable from data safety.

At the PEP boundary, you want controls like:

Control Purpose
Classify input/output Enforce data tags
Block disallowed data classes Prevent leakage
Redact/tokenize PII/PHI Lower-trust tool safety
Hash-only evidence retention Sensitive payload protection
DLP engine integration Enterprise standard compliance

This prevents:

  • "Allowed tool + sensitive data" accidents
  • Semantic leakage through agent tool calls
  • Evidence becoming a compliance liability

7) Evidence Pipeline: Control-to-Evidence by Default

This is the foundation of auditability.

Streams Emitted

Stream Contents
Decision events Allow/deny/escalate + rationale, policy bundle version + hash, controls evaluated
Action telemetry Tool id, operation, scope metadata, rate/spend counters
Outcome verification What changed (post-action check), failure modes and rollback actions

Evidence Pack Builder

Evidence is normalized, integrity-protected, and bundled into an Evidence Pack:

  • Per session / workflow / case
  • Hashed/signed (tamper-evident)
  • Exportable

Destinations

Destination Purpose
Immutable evidence store Append-only / WORM-aligned
SIEM/SOAR SOC visibility, detections, response
GRC/Audit Control testing + operating effectiveness
Data lake/analytics Trend analysis, drift detection

If you can't produce evidence packs, governance can't scale beyond trust.


8) Integrity: Hash Chains and Signing

Evidence is only evidence if:

  • It is complete
  • It is consistent
  • Tampering is detectable

Minimum Integrity Posture

  • Hash each event
  • Include previous_hash for chaining (append-only behavior)
  • Sign bundles (policy provenance)
  • Optionally sign evidence packs (non-repudiation)

This allows:

  • "This was the policy that ran"
  • "These were the decisions made"
  • "This is the approval trail"
  • "This record hasn't been altered"

9) Resilience and Degraded Mode: Safe Failure Behavior

Controls must remain safe under failure conditions.

Failure Modes to Design For

  • Semantic verifier outage / latency spikes
  • Policy registry unavailable
  • Approval system outage
  • Downstream tool failures
  • Evidence destination backpressure

Degraded Mode Strategies

Strategy When to Use
Local cache of last-known-good policy bundles Registry outage
Fail-closed for CRITICAL tools Default safe
Fail-open (with log) for LOW-risk safe operations Explicitly approved only
Automatic escalation for high-risk actions Semantic verification unavailable
Backpressure and queueing for evidence Never "drop silently"

Degraded mode should be explicit, governed, and evidenced.


10) Drift Detection: Where Governance Quietly Dies

Even with perfect architecture, governance fails through drift.

Drift Types

Type Definition
Config drift Deployed bundle version ≠ approved version
Coverage drift Tool calls bypass PEPs (direct calls, hidden integrations)
Inventory drift Tools used that aren't registered or tiered
Control drift Controls evaluated but evidence requirements not met

Drift Outputs

  • Daily coverage report (what % routed through PEPs)
  • Unknown tool report
  • "Bundle version distribution" across fleet
  • Bypass detection alerts

Drift is not an ops issue. It's a control failure.


11) Testing & Simulation: Governance Needs CI/CD

A runtime control plane must be tested like any critical system.

What to Include

Test Type Purpose
Policy unit tests Expected allow/deny outcomes
Scenario harness Known abuse cases
Canary enforcement Observe-only → enforce gradually
Chaos testing Degraded mode (semantic outage, registry outage)
Regression tests Tied to policy bundle versions

This prevents "governance broke production" and makes enforcement safe to adopt.


12) Operating Metrics: Measuring Control Effectiveness

Once governance runs at runtime, you can measure it like a mature control environment.

Core Metrics

Metric What It Measures
Coverage % of agent actions evaluated against policy
Enforcement posture Allow/deny/escalate rates by tool risk tier
Approval load Approvals per day, time-to-approve, rejection rates
Exception hygiene Active waivers, expiry compliance, usage frequency
Degraded mode frequency How often safety fallback was invoked
Latency impact Deterministic vs semantic decision timing
Drift rate Config/coverage/inventory drift events per period
Evidence completeness % of actions with complete evidence packs

These metrics become:

  • SOC dashboards
  • GRC control testing inputs
  • Executive assurance reporting

The Complete Diagram (Hybrid Control Plane)

This diagram ties it together (policy lifecycle → registries → enforcement → approvals → evidence):

flowchart TB
  %% Hybrid Reference Architecture: Gateway + Sidecar + Evidence Pipeline

  subgraph Gov["Policy Lifecycle & Governance"]
    direction TB
    R1["Policy-as-Code Repo<br/>Git / PR reviews"]
    R2["Approval Workflow<br/>CISO / GRC / SecArch"]
    R3["Policy Compiler<br/>+ Bundle Builder"]
    R4["Bundle Signing<br/>KMS / HSM"]
    R5["Policy Registry<br/>Versioned Bundles"]
    R6["Drift & Rollback<br/>deployed vs approved"]
    R1 --> R2 --> R3 --> R4 --> R5
    R5 --> R6
  end

  subgraph Reg["Registries"]
    direction TB
    TR["Tool Registry<br/>(owner, risk tier, scopes,<br/>data classes, spend/rate caps)"]
    AR["Agent Registry<br/>(agent id, owner, allowed intents)"]
  end

  subgraph Callers["Agent Callers"]
    direction TB
    A1["Agent App / Workflow"]
    A2["Multi-Agent Orchestrator"]
  end

  subgraph Enforce["Hybrid Enforcement Layer"]
    direction LR

    subgraph GW["Central Gateway PEP"]
      direction TB
      G0["Gateway PEP<br/>Intercept Tool Calls"]
      G1["Stage 1: Deterministic<br/>IAM, allowlists, scopes, caps"]
      G2["Stage 2: Semantic Verification<br/>intent / context checks"]
      G3{"Mode"}
      G4["Observe-only"]
      G5["Enforce (Allow/Deny)"]
      G6["Escalate for Approval"]
      G0 --> G1 --> G2 --> G3
      G3 --> G4
      G3 --> G5
      G3 --> G6
    end

    subgraph SC["Sidecar per Agent PEP"]
      direction TB
      S0["Agent Runtime"]
      S1["Sidecar PEP<br/>Local Intercept"]
      S2["Stage 1: Deterministic"]
      S3["Stage 2: Semantic Verification"]
      S4{"Mode"}
      S5["Observe-only"]
      S6["Enforce (Allow/Deny)"]
      S7["Escalate for Approval"]
      S0 --> S1 --> S2 --> S3 --> S4
      S4 --> S5
      S4 --> S6
      S4 --> S7
    end
  end

  subgraph Approvals["Approval & Exceptions"]
    direction TB
    H1["Step-up Auth<br/>high-risk approvals"]
    H2["Human Approval Workflow<br/>ServiceNow / Jira / Slack"]
    H3["Time-boxed Waiver / Exception<br/>compensating controls"]
    H1 --> H2 --> H3
  end

  subgraph Tools["Tooling / Action Surface"]
    direction TB
    T1["Internal APIs"]
    T2["SaaS APIs"]
    T3["Databases"]
    T4["Cloud Control Plane"]
  end

  subgraph Evidence["Evidence Pipeline"]
    direction TB
    E1["Decision Events<br/>allow / deny / escalate"]
    E2["Action Telemetry<br/>tool called, params meta"]
    E3["Outcome Verification<br/>what changed"]
    E4["Evidence Pack Builder<br/>normalize, hash, sign, bundle"]
    E5[("Immutable Evidence Store<br/>WORM - Append-only Log")]
    E6[("SIEM - SOAR")]
    E7[("GRC - Audit")]
    E8[("Data Lake - Analytics")]
    E1 --> E4
    E2 --> E4
    E3 --> E4
    E4 --> E5
    E4 --> E6
    E4 --> E7
    E4 --> E8
  end

  subgraph Trust["Identity & Attestation Signals"]
    direction TB
    I1["Workload Identity<br/>(cloud workload identity)"]
    I2["Optional Attestation<br/>(runtime signals)"]
  end

  R5 --> G0
  R5 --> S1
  TR --> G1
  TR --> S2
  AR --> G2
  AR --> S3
  Trust --> G1
  Trust --> S2

  A1 -->|Preferred: Local tools| S0
  A2 -->|Shared/Enterprise tools| G0

  G5 --> Tools
  S6 --> Tools

  G6 --> Approvals
  S7 --> Approvals

  Approvals -->|Approved| G5
  Approvals -->|Approved| S6

  Tools --> E2
  Tools --> E3
  G0 --> E1
  S1 --> E1
  Approvals --> E1

Pilot Blueprint: How to Implement This Without Breaking Production

Phase 1 — Observe-only (Week 1)

  • Deploy gateway for shared tools
  • Inject sidecars into one or two agent runtimes
  • Create tool registry entries for top tools
  • Emit evidence packs for every decision

Success criteria:

  • 95%+ tool call coverage through PEPs
  • Evidence pack exports reach SIEM/GRC/data lake

Phase 2 — Enforce CRITICAL Tools (Week 2)

Turn on enforcement for:

  • Cloud control plane actions
  • Bulk data export
  • Destructive database writes
  • Privileged SaaS admin actions

Success criteria:

  • Measurable deny reasons (not random failures)
  • Stable latency and error budgets
  • Approvals are enforceable (not advisory)

Phase 3 — Add Approvals + Waivers (Week 3)

  • Integrate approval workflows and step-up auth
  • Introduce time-boxed waivers
  • Validate drift detection alerts

Success criteria:

  • Approvals + exceptions appear in evidence packs
  • Drift reports are actionable and consistent

What This Enables (The Enterprise Value)

Once operational authenticity exists, enterprises can safely do things they currently avoid:

Capability Previously Blocked By
Autonomous workflow execution with bounded tools Unbounded risk
Production deployment of multi-agent systems Governance gaps
Controlled self-service automation for staff Compliance concerns
Audit-ready AI operations Manual evidence collection
Measurable assurance posture Governance theatre

The Takeaway

Agentic AI is not a model problem. It's a control plane problem.

The operational authenticity layer is the missing primitive that makes autonomous systems safe in production:

  • ✅ Policies become signed bundles
  • ✅ Tools and agents become governed assets
  • ✅ Enforcement happens at runtime (gateway + sidecar)
  • ✅ Humans approve the actions that should require humans
  • ✅ Every decision produces immutable evidence

That is what it means to make AI governance operational—not aspirational.


Frequently Asked Questions

What is agentic AI governance?

Agentic AI governance is the framework of policies, registries, and runtime controls that ensure autonomous agents act within their intended scope, adhere to security rules, and produce auditable evidence for every action they take.

What is the Operational Authenticity (OA) Layer?

The OA Layer is a specialized security architecture that sits between AI agents and their target systems. It enforces, verifies, and evidences intent-aligned AI behavior at runtime using a combination of gateways and sidecars.

Why is hybrid enforcement (Gateway + Sidecar) better for AI agents?

Hybrid enforcement provides the best of both worlds: Sidecars offer local, low-latency enforcement for per-team autonomy, while Gateways provide centralized, consistent governance for shared enterprise tools and high-risk actions.

What are Evidence Packs in AI governance?

Evidence Packs are tamper-evident bundles of decision logs, policy versions, and action outcomes. They provide the "proof of control" required by auditors to verify that AI agents are operating within established governance boundaries.


Author: Tushar Mishra Published: 09 Jan 2026 Version: v1.0 License: © Tushar Mishra

This is the capstone post in the FuseGov Reference Architecture series, bringing together all components into a complete, production-grade governance architecture for agentic AI.

Tushar Mishra
FuseGov Team | Autonomous Systems Governance

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